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This essay seeks to address the question regarding what conflict management techniques 
have been implemented in the Great Lakes region of Africa, specifically in connection to the 
Burundi political strife, and which technique is proven to be the most effective thus far. Since 
gaining its independence in 1962, Burundi has experienced at least two mass killings as a result of 
political and social contentions between civilian classes (Uvin 256). In hopes of preventing another 
genocide between the Hutu and the Tutsi ethnic groups in the Great Lakes region of Africa, 
national, regional, and international conflict management strategies have been implemented. In 
this paper, I will argue that the most effective strategy of conflict management implemented in 
Burundi is the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) because this African Union (AU) mandated 
peace operation strikes a balance between national and international involvement than the 
alternative techniques used such as United Nations (UN) facilitated dialogue and attempted 
mediation through a third-party state. First, I will outline the relevance of this topic, as it relates to 
conflict management techniques and genocide prevention. Next, I will provide a brief overview of 
the history of conflict in Burundi in order to create a context within which to continue the analysis 
of strategies implemented in this region. Third, I will provide a literature review of four important 
sources relating to conflict management techniques in Burundi, examining their interpretations of 
the situation. Finally, I will analyze the effectiveness of the initial UN investigations in Burundi, 
the negotiations of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, and AMIB. 
Having proved why the regional, militaristic approach is most effective in Burundi, I will end this 
paper with suggestions for further research regarding how to better combat the problems in the 
region through conflict management mechanisms. 
Studying conflict management strategies in Burundi is crucial because, despite its 
infrequent mention in genocide studies, Burundi experienced acts of genocide in 1972 when the 
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Tutsi government systematically murdered approximately 150 000 Hutu civilians (De Maio 89). 
More recently, UN investigations have confirmed acts of genocide reoccurring in 1988 and 1993 
on the basis of the same ethnic conflict between Hutu and Tutsi groups in the nation (Krain 174). 
With this being said, it is evident that ethnic conflict in Burundi is lasting and previous conflict 
management attempts have not alleviated the fundamental tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi. 
The current situation in Burundi is complicated by the fact that the government in power, led by 
President Pierre Nkurunziza, cracked down against journalists and civil society. Tensions remain 
high in the international community because of the August 2015 assassination attempt against 
human rights activist Pierre Claver Mbonimpa (www.un.org). Thus, it is increasingly important to 
stabilize Burundi. In order to effectively aid Burundi, the conflict management techniques 
attempted in the past must be reexamined. By investigating the benefits and flaws of each 
technique, a more effective conflict management mechanism can be attempted. Alternatively, a 
combination of strategies implemented in the past might be able to create a more holistic approach 
to conflict management.  
 Similar to many other African nations, Burundi struggles to recover from a history of 
colonialism. This colonial past created conflict between the Tutsi minority, which is economically 
and politically affluent in the nation, and the Hutu majority, who were systematically repressed 
under the Belgian regime (De Maio 89). The ethnic tensions pervasive in post-colonial Burundi 
echo the sentiments of their northern neighbor, Rwanda. Burundi, however, was the first state to 
experience acts of genocide in the year 1972. This genocide is seldom recognized despite the fact 
that the Tutsi government in Burundi systematically killed approximately 150 000 Hutu, which is 
almost twice the number of lives taken in the Rwandan Genocide of 1994 (De Maio 89). Political 
instability compounds with the nation’s struggle with ethnic tensions, creating a more hostile 
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environment. Since gaining independence from imperialist Belgium, it has proven difficult for 
Burundi to commit to a stable government that citizens are willing to accept. Patricia Daley, 
Associate Professor of the Human Geography of Africa at the University of Oxford, provides a 
brief overview of political instability when she writes: 
Burundi has been highly unstable with six governments between 1962 and 1966, 
the abolition of the monarchy (1966), four successful coup d’états (1965, 1976, 
1987 & 1994), and the assassination of the first democratically elected president,  
Melchoir Ndadaye, in October 1993 (333-334). 
This description of the instability in the Burundi government exemplifies how dire the situation 
has become, showing little sign of progress. This lack of progress is not a sign of lack of regional 
or international effort, but more so it depicts the need for a tailored conflict management strategy 
based on the specifics of the conflict. 
There have been several conflict management strategies implemented in Burundi since 
the escalation of conflict in 1993, including UN investigations, sanctions, ceasefires, third-party 
intervention, a peace agreement. UN investigations began in Burundi to research the gravest 
atrocities of 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991 and from 1993 onwards, which are now detailed in UN reports 
(Schweiger 654). Unfortunately, the UN did not anticipate the repercussions they would receive 
from their findings. After sending three international missions to Burundi, the UN classified the 
events of 1993 as a genocide under international law, but almost completely avoided the topic of 
the 1972 massacre that yielded a higher death toll (Schweiger 655). These findings created an 
image of a biased international community which failed to recognize the 1972 massacre for the 
systematic genocide that it was. Following the UN involvement in Burundi, regional states put 
forward their own conflict management techniques to deal with the tensions. 
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Regional states, such as Rwanda, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), and Uganda, attempted to use an economic blockade on land-locked Burundi as a means 
of pressuring the regime to come to a peaceful agreement, but they soon learned that this would 
not be effective. In order to pressure the regime in Burundi, regional states placed economic 
sanctions on the nation from October 1996 until January 1999 (Daley 339). Unfortunately, this 
created a huge backlash from the Burundi military, who launched a campaign against the sanctions 
internationally (Daley 339). This embargo failed to incite change because it was affecting the 
civilians far more than the elite who held the control in Burundi. The failed sanctions did not stop 
the Great Lakes region from continuing to push forward their agenda of peace-making in the 
nation. 
Interventions in Burundi can be divided into three distinct phases. First, after Tutsi rebels 
assassinated President Melchoir Ndadaye and several other high-ranking members of the 
government in 1993, the UN became involved in facilitating negotiations of new power-sharing 
arrangements (De Maio 94). Second, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania mediated the Regional 
Peace Initiative, which included leaders from all of the nations in the Great Lakes region, from 
1995 until his death in 1999 (Hendricks 15-16). Third, the Burundi government by-passed Arusha 
committees by having closed door talks with South African President Nelson Mandela, who took 
over the role of Nyerere after his death, which ultimately led to the signing of the Arusha Peace 
and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi in August of 2000 (Daley 345). Despite the 
aforementioned conflict management strategies were put into action, the situation in Burundi 
remains tumultuous today. Scholars of Burundi, Genocide, and the Great Lakes region of Africa 
provide analysis of the benefits and shortcomings of each conflict management mechanism. 
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The political crisis in Burundi centers on long-existing tensions between ethnic groups 
create lasting political, economic, and social problems in a nation. Studies of conflict management 
in Burundi peak in roughly three stages. First, research on this effect in Burundi gained popularity 
following the 1993 assassination of government figures, likely due to the international recognition 
of this event as it related to the Rwandan Genocide the next year. Next, scholars turn back to 
examining Burundi in the early 2000s to analyze the effectiveness of the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement signed at the turn of the millennium. Third, an interest in the topic arose 
again in 2015 as civilian protests erupted against incumbent President Nkurunziza in response to 
his running for a third term (www.bbc.com). Most scholars agree that the conflict management 
strategies in Burundi were flawed by design or execution. The following scholars represent the 
main arguments in the academic community regarding how conflict management strategies should 
adapt to suit Burundi’s current political climate. 
Law and Politics Professor, Filip Reyntjens, focuses on the legal aspects of government 
power-sharing in Burundi as part of his research conducted at the University of Antwerp. In his 
2006 article “Briefing: Burundi: A Peaceful Transition after a Decade of War”, which was 
published in the peer-reviewed African Affairs journal, he compares the power-sharing 
arrangements of the 1993 government and the 2003 regime. Recognizing several challenges that 
continue to face the government of Burundi, Reyntjens concludes that the situation in Burundi 
today differs from 1993 because expectations have changed and there is active regional 
involvement (131). Taking his work a step further, some authors choose to focus on the efforts put 
forward by regional actors. 
Isiaka A. Badmus, faculty member of the Department of International Institutional 
relations at the International University of Humanities and Social Sciences (IUHSS), has written 
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over fourteen works on the subject of African peacekeeping missions. In his chapter, “The African 
Mission in Burundi”, featured in the peer-edited 2015 publication entitled The African Union’s 
Role in Peacekeeping: Building on Lessons Learned from Security Operations, Badmus focuses 
on the AU-UN collaborative effort to secure peace in Burundi through the African Mission in 
Burundi (AMIB). After conducting interviews for this chapter in four African countries, Badmus 
concludes that political strife in Burundi is a “centralist internal conflict” due to the centralized 
control of state power in one ethnic group (113). Similarly, other scholars find the difficulty of 
conflict in Burundi to lay in the ethnic tensions. 
Jennifer de Maio, Political Science Professor at the College of Social and Behavioural 
Sciences, agrees that the greatest challenge to peace stems from the deeply rooted fear that exists 
between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups (90). In her 2009 book, Confronting Ethnic Conflict: 
The Role of Third Parties in Managing Africa’s Civil Wars, which began as dissertation research 
at the University of California, de Maio proves passionate about all of the ethnic conflicts in Africa, 
not just the major ones, by including a chapter entitled “Intervention and Genocide: Burundi, 1995-
2003.”  Examining the role of third parties as a conflict management strategy to end civil wars, de 
Maio argues that Burundi is complicated because it is difficult to classify the nation as pre-conflict, 
in conflict, or post-conflict, as the conflict has remained constant for decades (91). Another 
Political Scientist critiques the intervention methods in Burundi for being mismanaged due to the 
complicated nature of the conflict. 
Cheryl Hendricks, who is a member of the Department of Politics and International 
Relations at the University of Johannesburg, wrote the peer-reviewed 2015 publication entitled 
“South Africa’s Approach to Conflict Management in Burundi and the DRC: Promoting Human 
Security?”. She argues that the approach South Africa takes to conflict management tends to fall 
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short of achieving their mandate because they focus too much on the state and political elites. 
Hendricks recommends that South Africa come to a better understanding of local opinions in a 
conflict in order to incorporate civilians into the peace-making process (27). These four authors 
provide comprehensive overviews of the conflict in Burundi and agree on which strategies have 
failed at promoting peace, yet ultimately come to several different conclusions about which 
conflict management techniques should be implemented going forward. 
Authors Badmus, de Maio, and Hendricks stress the importance of influential regional 
actors’ participation in managing conflict in Burundi. De Maio concludes that interventions in 
Burundi have been somewhat effective thanks to the impacts of regional powers. She draws upon 
the example of negotiating the Arusha Accords to show how influential Mandela was at conducting 
closed-door talks with all parties in Burundi and coming to a peace agreement (De Maio 96). 
Badmus furthers this by noting that regional actors’ ambition must not overshadow their actual 
capacity to manage a conflict (127). He supports this recommendation by examining how the broad 
mandate of AMIB achieved most of its mandate, but failed to facilitate effective Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and lacked civilian participation in the processes 
(Badmus 138). Although Hendricks does not explicitly recommend the use of regional forces in 
conflict management, she stresses South Africa’s influence in Burundi. Hendricks analyzes South 
Africa’s conception of peace-building through the case studies of Burundi and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), drawing her to the conclusion that intervening states should learn from 
their shortcomings to create an entirely new conflict management approach (18). Other authors 
turn their attention to issues surrounding the electoral system in Burundi and how the impacts the 
legitimacy of the transitional government.  
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De Maio and Reyntjens’ works both analyze the effectiveness of power-sharing in the 
government, meaning having the authority split proportionally between the two main ethnic groups 
in Burundi. Reyntjens provides an in depth analysis of the differences between power-sharing in 
1993 and 2003, concluding that there are many new challenges facing the nation given the time 
passed without a stable government and new international involvement (132). Contrastingly, de 
Maio take a more holistic approach. She examines the combination of military intervention, 
regional negotiations, and electoral reform in her writing. De Maio holds that a combination of 
strategies is needed to support a comprehensive peace in the region (111). Regardless of 
ideological differences, both of these authors recommend the continued effort to have effective 
power-sharing in Burundi as a means of reducing pervasive ethnic tensions in the Great Lakes 
region.  
Finally, most of the authors also recommend the involvement of civilians in the conflict 
management process to create a lasting peace. Badmus, de Maio, and Hendricks all agree that it is 
necessary for civilians’ voices to be heard in order to avoid the rebellions and civil unrest 
experienced in the past. This suggestion proves the effectiveness of researching the flaws of 
conflict management strategies as a means of mitigating the problems that have arisen in the past. 
Hendricks notes that, in order to secure lasting peace, the African philosophy of Ubuntu 
(humanity) must be used to promote human rights and security for the people of Burundi (12). 
Civilian participation, which has been lacking in previously implemented conflict management 
strategies would be beneficial to Burundi by reducing the likelihood of civilian unrest. Of the 
conflict management strategies analyzed by the four aforementioned authors, three important 
examples are brought forward, namely UN investigations post-1993, negotiations of the Arusha 
Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, and the AMIB. 
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The least effective conflict management strategy in Burundi was the UN assistance with 
the framework of a transitional government amidst civil war. After the assassination of President 
Ndadaye in October 1993, the UN facilitated dialogue with the government of Burundi in order to 
come to a power-sharing agreement. In terms of conflict management strategies, power-sharing 
refers to “dividing the institutions of governance between political parties and rebel movements, 
in the context of creating a new constitution and democratic elections” (Daley 335). With the 
objectives of preventing further political destabilization and restoring security in Burundi, UN 
Secretary-General, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, began power-sharing negotiations on 25 November 
1993 (Vandeginste 69). Abdallah held negotiations with the coalition of Hutu parties, Forces du 
Changement Democratique (FCD), and the Tutsi opposition, Coalition des Partis Politiques de 
l’Opposition (CPPO). By 10 September 1994, the Convention of the Government deal was struck, 
mandating that a coalition government would consist of 45 per cent of CPPO ministers and 55 per 
cent of FCD ministers (Vandeginste 69). Abdallah praised the success of reaching this agreement 
quickly to establish a government that represents the two main communities in Burundi, but he 
overestimated the influence of the agreement.  
Soon after the signing of the international accommodation in 1994, the agreement began 
collapsing. The president and national assembly were powerless in Burundi due to a vehemently 
divided cabinet (Reyntjens 117). Additionally, the military controlled the fraction of state power 
existing in Burundi in the mid-1990s. On 15 July 1996, a military coup restored former President 
Buyoya to power, undermining the entire power-sharing agreement (Reyntjens 118). The power-
sharing agreement failed in practice because of the lack of consensus among signatories and the 
prominent resistance to the agreement by Hutu and Tutsi extremists alike (Vandeginste 70). 
Tensions escalated in June 1994, when Nyangoma established the Conseil National pour la 
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Défense de la Démoncratie (CNDD) and denounced the imposed power-sharing agreement was a 
violation of international law (Vandeginste 70). Ultimately, the UN did not achieve their aims of 
generating an effective power-sharing agreement. Failure to complete their objectives suggests 
that the involvement of the UN did not take advantage of timing and were the wrong mechanism 
to use as a means of resolving an ethnic dispute in Africa. 
Intervention by the UN proved ineffective in many respects. First, the international 
involvement was limited due to the fact that there was no mechanism in place to enforce the power-
sharing agreement. Since the UN mandate did not extend to peace enforcement, once the 
agreement was signed by all parties in 1994 the international organization virtually disappeared 
from the conflict-ridden government structure of Burundi. Due to the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms, the government proved unable to maintain power and a military coup was successful 
in taking over Burundi. The agreement, however, would have been more effective in helping the 
government stabilize and maintain power if there was a mechanism in place to enforce the 
ministers’ following of the agreement. 
Second, the UN initiatives in Burundi are no exceptions to the common critique of this 
international body, which is that it pushes liberal democratic values. As has been the case in other 
African states, the implementation of Western liberal democracies does not appear accepted by 
civilians, elites, and rebel groups alike. History suggests that consociational democracy and 
Western ideals may just not be suited for Burundi. After a history of colonialism and fighting for 
independence, it is likely that the people of Burundi would not take well to an agreement pushed 
upon them by a more powerful institution. In this respect, more civilian involvement would 
generate an agreement viewed as legitimate by the citizens of Burundi. 
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Third, once the UN became involved in facilitating talks amongst Hutu and Tutsi elites 
regarding power-sharing agreements, they failed to be successful. Although Abdallah stated that 
he found the signing of the 1994 power-sharing agreement to be a success, this depends on the 
accepted definition of success (Vandeginste 69). As stated above, the goal of a power-sharing 
agreement is to create a new constitution involving all major disputing parties in order to restore 
security in a state. The Convention of the Government stipulated how the ethnic groups would 
distribute power in the government, but it failed to create a new constitution or restore security in 
the state. In fact, security in Burundi decreased significantly when Tutsi and Hutu extremists failed 
to respect the imposed agreement by the UN. The breakdown of this agreement largely suggests 
that ethnic strife requires a more grassroots approach to reducing deeply rooted tensions, not a 
mandate suggesting two opposing groups simply work it out in the parliament. Regional actors 
sought to play a more comprehensive role in negotiating the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation 
Agreement for Burundi. 
Regionally facilitated peace agreements proved more effective than the UN involvement 
in Burundi. Heads of State in the Great Lakes Region of Africa came together in the early 1990s 
to create the Regional Peace Initiative, which called for the creation of a peace agreement in 
Burundi (Hendricks 15). Negotiations for the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for 
Burundi took place from early 1996 until the signing of the peace agreement on 28 August 2000. 
The former President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, given his international prestige and regional 
leverage, facilitated the peace process in Burundi and advised regional governments in such a way 
that made sure that conflict management remained a regional priority (De Maio 95). These 
negotiations took place in two main locations: Arusha, Tanzania, served as the location for both 
formal and informal consultations, while secret talks between the Burundi government and CNDD 
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rebel groups were held in Rome, Italy (De Maio 95). Unfortunately, President Nyerere was unable 
to achieve his goal of achieving peace and stability in Burundi due to his untimely death in 1999. 
For the remainder of negotiations, South African President Nelson Mandela took over the 
responsibilities of the late Tanzanian president. 
Under the leadership of President Mandela, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation 
Agreement for Burundi was signed in 2000. Mandela was integral in setting up a foundation for 
the transitional government. The agreement stipulates the breakdown of the legislature, parliament 
and national assembly, which led to the 2001 inauguration of the transitional government. Lasting 
effects of the Arusha Agreement are noticeable throughout the early 2000s. The transitional 
government, comprised of President Pierre Buyoya and Vice-President Domitien Ndayizeye, 
developed a new constitution in 2005 embodying the principles of the Arusha Agreement 
(Hendricks 18). Overall, the Arusha Peace Agreement appears to be successful in promoting peace 
in Burundi, but the transitional government did not follow the proposed rules in practice. Thus, the 
agreement was viewed as merely an unattainable ideal. 
The negotiation process leading up to the Arusha Peace Agreement proved more 
successful than the UN facilitated dialogue, which led to the dismantling of the government and a 
military overthrow. Negotiations from 1996 to 2000 were more successful because they were 
facilitated by a regionally and internationally endorsed figure. The involvement of President 
Nyerere, and later President Mandela, allowed for the conflict to be dealt with in a more Afro-
centric way. Despite successful and strategic negotiations, this strategy proved ineffective when 
the peace agreement broke down shortly after implementation.  
The peace agreement negotiations were problematic from the start, as many Tutsi 
perceived Tanzanians to be pro-Hutu (De Maio 101). Although President Nyerere was thought to 
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be a unique moral authority amongst the African community, dissenters would forever view him 
in terms of his association with his home nation, which was seen as biased. Nyerere was known 
for being opposed to coups, and was sympathetic to the Burundian Hutu refugees seeking asylum 
(Daley 339). Similarly, Nelson Mandela has been accused of carrying with himself a personal bias. 
Critics argue that Mandela viewed the conflict in Burundi through a South African lens, seeing 
Tutsi as comparable to the whites in South Africa and the Hutu as oppressed like the African 
National Congress (ANC) (De Maio 102). Unfortunately, these facilitators were unable to broker 
a completely well-received peace agreement because of their personal perspectives. 
South African involvement in the peace negotiations focused too much on the elite and 
government figures in Burundi, instead of aiming for a ground-up method of peace that would be 
recognized as legitimate by citizens. South Africa’s approach to the Arusha negotiations drew on 
old practices of power-sharing, which focused exclusively on the state and elite members of society 
(Hendricks 18). The Arusha Peace Agreement negotiations did not include civilians, which 
explains the civic unrest present in Burundi. It would have benefited the Arusha Agreement to 
include recommendations of Bashinantahe. This local arbitration has a long history and 
understanding of being part of grassroots conflict management in Burundi (De Maio 102). With 
this being said, citizens’ involvement in the conflict management process is valued culturally 
amongst the Hutu and Tutsi, thus it would have been an asset if included in the agreement. 
The biggest flaw of the Arusha Agreement is that there was no measure of sustained aid 
in Burundi, which would have assisted them in accurately implementing the entirety of the 
agreement. Instead of continuing to help the conflict management process in Burundi, South Africa 
seemed to abandon them in 2009 because the country appeared to be stabilizing (Hendricks 19). 
This is often interpreted as South Africa relinquishing control back to the UN Peacebuilding 
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Commission and the newly elected Burundi Government to continue with ensuring human security 
and democratization (Hendricks 19). This hindered the peace process in Burundi by having the 
operations change hands again, and reducing the amount of regional involvement in the situation. 
In retrospect, it is clear that regional involvement would have been beneficial during election 
periods at least because, as was mentioned earlier in this paper, rebellions sparked again prior to 
the 2015 elections.  
 The most effective method of conflict management in Burundi thus far has been the 
African Mission in Burundi. On 2 April 2003, the AU deployed the armed peace operation of 
AMIB as instances of armed conflict were on the rise and they were still awaiting UN 
peacekeeping forces (Drumon 53). During December 2002 Arusha meetings, regional actors 
concluded that mitigating the conflict in Burundi would be the first step to reducing violence in 
the entire Great Lakes Region (Badmus 121-122). For this reason, AMIB was deployed in order 
to supervise the ceasefire agreement and solidify the peace process in Burundi. African Security 
Review comprehensively outlines the mandate of AMIB, writing that the mission was mandated 
to: 
Act as liaison between the parties; monitor and verify the implementation of the 
ceasefire agreement; … secure identified assembly and disengagement areas; 
facilitate and provide technical assistance to disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR) processes; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; 
co-ordinate mission activities with the United Nations’ presence in Burundi; and  
provide VIP protection for designated returning leaders (Boshoff 41-42). 
AMIB officially took place from its creation in 2003 until 1 June 2004, when authority was 
transferred to the UN mission in Burundi (ONUB). During this time, the mission worked towards 
completing almost all of its mandate, making it successful at reducing the conflict in Burundi.  
Similar to previous conflict management strategies, AMIB was not without its setbacks. Unable 
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to fully achieve its mandate, AMIB failed to effectively implement DDR and the AU’s ambition 
was overshadowed by their capacity at times. For the purposes of this paper, success will be 
measured by the ability for AMIB to complete its aims and to create a more secure environment 
overall in Burundi. 
AMIB proved that the UN and the AU could collaborate with each other to deal with 
African peace operations (Badmus 112). The involvement of both regional and international 
bodies gives this peace mission more legitimacy than UN mandated power sharing. As mentioned 
previously, other conflict management techniques failed because of their lack of support from the 
people of Burundi, but AMIB had the support of the Great Lakes Region. This recognition by 
African nations served as reassurance to civilians and elites alike, reducing the likelihood that 
AMIB would be another “quick fix” for their conflict sent in from the West. Acting as a support 
mechanism for the Arusha Agreement, AMIB built confidence in the agreement though flexibly 
handling new developments on the ground (Bellamy 193). This increased confidence in the 
previous conflict management strategies, while actively combating rebel groups on the ground. 
Militaristic enforcement of peace in Burundi proved more effective than negotiations and 
peace agreements attempted in the past. AMIB consisted of approximately 3 250 armed members, 
who worked tirelessly to maintain peace and stability during a civil war (Bellamy 166). When it 
comes to conflict management, many individuals critique the use of military force as a means of 
creating peace. In this case, however, this military operation was the first strategy that was truly 
successful at stabilizing the political climate and reducing deaths in Burundi. Due to the armed 
forces, AMIB was able to enforce the ceasefire agreement with something more deterring than a 
piece of paper. Although AMIB participated in fighting on the ground, in attempts to create peace, 
the only groups targeted were the opposition and rebel groups (Bellamy 192). These fatalities can 
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be viewed as necessary for the greater good because they deter other rebels from continuing with 
violent behaviour and protect civilians. Additionally, AMIB successfully supervised ceasefire 
agreements in Burundi, which other conflict management strategies were unable to do.  
With a total budget of $134 million, the African forces were able to provide substantial 
protection of political figures in Burundi and deter the escalation of political violence that the 
nation had become accustomed to (Badmus 128). Given the nation’s history of assassinations and 
coups, protecting the leader who would be integral in making lasting peace in Burundi was 
imperative. This de-escalation of violence also contributed to many parts of the mandate, including 
protection of VIP politicians and monitoring the respect of the ceasefire.  
The most remarkable success of AMIB was its ability to mitigate conflict and stabilize 
approximately 95 per cent of the country (Rittberger 163). The presence of AMIB and the 
deterrence strategies played a large part in reducing the physical violence. By this stage, the 
conflict had been reduced only to Bujumbura Ruale, which was where the National Liberation 
Front (FLN) remained (Peen 379). AMIB continued to provide peace and security by helping 
refugees and internally displaced persons return to Burundi and receive the necessary humanitarian 
aid (Peen 380). Such stabilization made way for the UN Security Council to pass Resolution 1545 
on 21 May 2004, commissioning a UN Operation in Burundi (Badmus 126). Referring directly to 
AMIB’s mandate, this was the initial intention of the Mission. The mandate outlines coordinating 
AMIB activities with the UN Peacebuilding Commission present in Burundi (Boshoff 42). In this 
respect, AMIB is a success. The mission completed the task of stabilizing the civil war-ridden 
nation to a state in which the UN could send in a mission to further bring about peace on an 
international level.  
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 In sum, this paper addressed the question: which conflict management technique, of the 
three which are applicable to the political strife in Burundi, is the most effective and why? I argued 
that the UN-AU collaboration with the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) is the most effective 
technique so far because it has proven more successful at moving towards peace than UN 
facilitated negotiations for a power-sharing government and the African-led negotiations for the 
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi. UN-negotiated power-sharing proved 
the least effective strategy because it lacked a mechanism to enforce agreements, imposed values 
that were not inherently African and the government structure broke down soon after. Negotiations 
of the Arusha Peace Agreement were somewhat effective in reducing violence, but negotiators’ 
personal biases were regarded as negative by civilians, too much focus was placed on states and 
the elite and there was no sustained aid to stabilize Burundi before regional members pulled out. 
Overall, AMIB proves most successful because it was viewed by civilians as a legitimate coalition 
by the AU and UN, there was regional involvement, the military was able to enforce ceasefire 
agreements and 95 per cent of the nation was stabilized.  
 Since AMIB has been proven most effective in reducing violence amidst a civil war, it 
brings about reason to reconsider the use of militaristic conflict management strategies. In the case 
of Burundi, with such deeply-rooted ethnic turmoil, armed forces proved effective in deterring 
military and rebel groups from breaking ceasefire agreements. AMIB was not perfect and did not 
achieve its entire mandate. AMIB successfully reduced violence and prepared for the UN mission 
to follow, but failed at providing effective measures for DDR and provided an overly ambitious 
mandate. By analyzing the conflict management strategies used in Burundi, scholars are able to 
see what worked well in the past and which methods were ineffective. Going forward, researchers 
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can analyze the best hybrid of strategies to manage the conflict in Burundi and if this can be applied 
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